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 SBA Loan Guarantees and Local Economic Performance 
 
 
The essence of the American economic system of private 
enterprise is free competition.  Only through full and free competition can 
free markets, free entry into business, and opportunities for the expression 
and growth of personal initiative and individual judgment be assured.  The 
preservation and expansion of such competition is not only to the 
economic well-being but to the security of this Nation.  Such security and 
well-being cannot be realized unless the actual and potential capacity of 
small business is encouraged and developed.  It is the declared policy of 
the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel, assist, and protect 
insofar as is possible the interests of small-business concerns in order to 
preserve free competitive enterprise, to insure that a fair proportion of the 
total purchases and contracts for supplies and services for the 
Government be placed with small-business enterprises, and to maintain 
and strengthen the overall economy of the Nation.
 1
 
The promotion of small businesses is a cornerstone of economic policy for a large 
number of industrialized countries.  Public support for small enterprise appears to be 
based on the widely held perception that the small business sector is an incubator of 
economic growth, a place where innovation takes place and new ideas become 
economically viable business enterprises.  In addition, policymakers routinely point to 
small businesses as important sources of employment growth – even though economic 
studies find little evidence to support this claim.  It is not surprising, then, that there is 
widespread political support for government programs, tax breaks, and other subsidies 
aimed at encouraging the growth and development of small business in the United States, 
and increasingly, around the world. 
A particular area of concern for policymakers is whether small businesses have access to 
adequate credit.  After all, a lot of small firms are relatively young and have little or no 
credit history.  Lenders may also be reluctant to fund small firms with new and 
innovative products because of the difficulty associated with evaluating the risk of such 
products.  These difficulties are classic information problems—problems obtaining 
sufficient information about the parties involved in a transaction—and they may prevent 
otherwise creditworthy firms from obtaining credit.  If information problems are 
                                                 
1 See Public Law 163, Section 202. substantial, they can lead to credit rationing, that is, loans are allocated by some 
mechanism other than price. If small businesses face credit rationing, the next Google, 
Microsoft, or Starbucks might wither on the vine for want of funding.  To the extent that 
credit rationing significantly affects small business credit markets, a rationale exists for 
supporting small enterprises through government programs aimed at improving small 
business access to credit.  
One specific government intervention aimed at improving the private market’s 
allocation of credit to small enterprises is the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
guaranteed lending program. SBA loan guarantees are well established, and their volume 
has grown over the past decade.  Nearly 20 million small businesses have received direct 
or indirect help from one or another of the SBA’s programs since 1953.  The SBA's 
current business loan portfolio of roughly 219,000 loans is worth more than $45 billion, 
making it the largest single financial backer of small businesses in the United States.  
Over the period 1991 to 2000, the SBA assisted almost 435,000 small businesses in 
obtaining more than $94.6 billion in loans, more than in the entire history of the agency 
before 1991.  No other lender in this country has been responsible for as much small 
business financing as the SBA has during that time (SBA, 2004).  These lending numbers 
are remarkable when one considers that SBA loan guarantees are aimed at that segment 
of small business borrowers that presumably would not otherwise have access to credit. It 
is interesting that the dramatic growth in SBA loan guarantees over the past decade has 
occurred at a time when advances in computer and communications technology have 
substantially reduced information costs in the economy.  To the extent that technological 
innovation has improved the information efficiency of credit markets—especially small 
business credit markets—this increase in SBA guaranteed lending has occurred at a time 
when the benefits of SBA guarantees should be declining. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 we provide a 
brief review of the academic literature on credit rationing and relationship lending.  This 
literature is consistent with the hypothesis that information problems in lending markets 
are particularly severe in the small enterprise credit market and hence provides a rationale 
for SBA loan guarantees.  An overview of SBA lending programs is presented in section 
3.  Section 4 outlines the data, our hypotheses and empirical strategy.  The results appear 
  2in section 5.  Overall, our empirical results are consistent with a positive, albeit small, 
impact of SBA guaranteed lending on personal income growth.  Finally, our conclusions 
and future research questions are outlined in section 6. 
2.  The economics of credit markets 
The economic justification for any government-sponsored small business lending 
program or loan guarantee program must rest on a generally acknowledged failure of the 
private sector to allocate loans efficiently.  Absent such a clearly identified problem with 
private sector lending to small businesses, the SBA’s activities would simply seem a 
wasteful, politically motivated subsidy to this sector of the economy. 
Many economists, most notably Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss, contend that 
private lending institutions may indeed fail to allocate loans efficiently because of 
fundamental information problems in the market for small business loans.   These 
information problems may be so severe that they lead to credit rationing and constitute 
the failure of the credit market.  Stiglitz and Weiss argue that when banks are deciding 
whether to make a loan, they are concerned about the interest rate they receive on the 
loan and the riskiness of the loan. But the imperfect information that is present in loan 
markets after banks have evaluated loan applications may cause two effects that allow the 
interest rate itself to affect the riskiness of the loan pool. When the price (here, the 
interest rate) affects the nature of the transaction, it is unlikely that a price will emerge 
that suits either the available buyers or sellers (that is, no price will “clear the market”). 
The first effect, adverse selection, affects the ability of markets to allocated credit on 
price by removing the lower risk borrowers from the set of potential borrowers.  The 
second effect, moral hazard, reduces the ability of prices to clear the lending markets by 
influencing the actions of borrowers.   
The adverse selection effect is a consequence of different borrowers having 
different probabilities of repaying their loan.  The expected return to the bank on a loan 
obviously depends on the probability of repayment, so the bank would like to be able to 
identify borrowers who are more likely to repay.  But it is difficult to identify such 
borrowers.  Typically, the bank will use a variety of screening devices to do so.  The 
interest rate that a borrower is willing to pay may act as one such screening device.  For 
  3example, those who are willing to pay a higher interest rate are likely to be, on average, 
worse risks.  These borrowers are willing to borrow at a higher interest rate because they 
perceive their probability of repaying the loan to be lower. So, as the interest rate rises, 
the average “riskiness” of those who borrow increases, and this may actually result in 
lowering the bank’s expected profits from lending.  
Similarly, as the interest rate and other terms of the contract change, the behavior 
of the borrower is likely to also change.  For instance, raising the interest rate decreases 
the profitability of projects which succeed.  Higher interest rates may thus induce firms to 
undertake projects riskier projects – ones with lower probabilities of success but higher 
payoffs when successful.  In other words, the price a firm pays for credit can affect its 
investment decision. This is the moral hazard problem. 
As a result of these two effects, a bank’s expected return may increase less rapidly 
than the interest rate; and, beyond a point, may actually decrease.  Clearly, under these 
conditions, it is conceivable that the demand for credit may exceed the supply of credit in 
equilibrium. Although traditional analysis would argue that in the presence of an excess 
demand for credit, unsatisfied borrowers would offer to pay a higher interest rate to the 
bank, bidding up the interest rate until demand equals supply, it does not happen in this 
case.  This is because the bank would not lend to someone who offered to pay the higher 
interest rate, as such a borrower is likely to be a worse risk than the average current 
borrower.  The expected return on a loan to this borrower at the higher interest rate is 
actually lower than the expected return on the loans the bank is currently making.  Hence, 
there are no competitive forces leading supply to equal demand, and credit is rationed. 
Importance of lending relationships 
Kane and Malkiel (1965) come to a similar conclusion about the possibility of 
banks rationing credit.  But they also suggest that the extent of credit rationing depends 
on the strength of existing customer relationships; the size, stability, and prospects for 
future growth of deposits; and the existence of profitable future lending opportunities.  
That is, loans may be rationed to current and prospective borrowers in accordance with 
the cohesion of the existing relationships along with expectations about the future 
profitability of those relationships. 
  4Petersen and Rajan (1994) extended the notion that relationships are important 
factors in determining credit rationing.  They suggest that the causes of credit rationing, 
adverse selection and moral hazard, may be more prominent when firms are young or 
small.  However, through close and continued interaction, a firm may provide a lender 
with sufficient information about, and a voice in, the firm’s affairs so as to lower the cost 
and increase the availability of credit.  These authors also suggest that an important 
dimension of a relationship is its duration.  Conditional on its positive past experience 
with the borrower, the bank may expect future loans to be less risky.  This should reduce 
its expected cost of lending and increase its willingness to provide funds.   
Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest that in addition to interaction over time, 
relationships can be built through interaction over multiple products.  That is, borrowers 
may obtain more than just loans from a bank.  Borrowers may purchase a variety of 
financial services and also maintain checking and savings accounts with the bank.  These 
added dimensions of a relationship can affect the firm’s borrowing cost in two ways.  
First they increase the precision of the lender’s information about the borrower.  For 
example, the lender can learn about the firm’s sales by monitoring the cash flowing 
through its checking account or by factoring the firm’s accounts receivables.  Second, the 
lender can spread any fixed costs of producing information about the firm over multiple 
products.  Petersen and Rajan (1994) report that both effects reduce the lender’s costs of 
providing loans and services, and the former effect increases the availability of funds to 
the firm. 
Berger and Udell (1995) also study the importance of relationships in the 
extension of credit to small firms.  They find that small firms with longer banking 
relationships borrow at lower rates and are less likely to pledge collateral than are other 
small firms.  These effects appear to be both economically and statistically significant.  
According to Berger and Udell, these results suggest that banks accumulate increasing 
amounts of this private information over the duration of the bank-borrower relationship 
and use this information to refine their loan contract terms. 
  53.  Small Business Administration loan guarantee programs 
SBA loan guarantees should improve credit allocation by providing a mechanism 
for pricing loans that is independent of borrower behavior.  By reducing the expected loss 
associated with a loan default, the guarantee increases the expected return to the lender – 
without increasing the lending rate.  In the absence of adverse selection, lenders could 
simply offer loan rates to borrowers that reflected the average risk of the pool of 
borrowers.
2  With the guarantee in place, the lender could profitably extend credit at loan 
rates below what would be dictated by the risk of the average borrower.  The reason for 
this is that the guarantee increases the profitability of the loan by reducing the losses to 
the bank in those instances when the borrower defaults.  To the extent that the loan 
guarantee reduces the rate of interest at which banks are willing to lend, external loan 
guarantees should help mitigate moral hazard.  After all, lowering the lending rate 
increases the number of low risk borrowers applying for credit which, in turn, increases 
the likelihood that the average risk of firms applying for loans is representative of the 
pool of borrowers. Hence, external loan guarantees help mitigate adverse selection.  
Moral hazard behavior of borrowers is also mitigated because the lower lending rates 
afforded by external guarantees reduce the bankruptcy threshold and thereby increase the 
expected return of safe projects vis-à-vis riskier ones.  Thus, in theory, SBA loan 
guarantees should reduce the probability that a viable small business is credit rationed.   
Because relationships may be more costly for small businesses to establish 
relative to large businesses, and because lack of relationships may lead to severe credit 
rationing in the small business credit market, some form of government intervention to 
assist small businesses in establishing relationships with lenders may be appropriate.  
However, the nature of intervention must be carefully evaluated.  SBA’s guaranteed 
lending programs may well be a reasonable intervention as they serve as a form of 
substitute for small business collateral. The program also reduces the risk to the lender of 
establishing a relationship with informationally opaque small business borrowers.  
Finally, the SBA loan guarantee programs may improve the intermediation process by 
                                                 
2 This is because each loan made would reflect a random draw from the pool of borrowers.  If the bank 
made a large number of small loans to borrowers in the pool then the bank’s loan portfolio would have the 
same risk and return characteristics of the pool of borrowers.   
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meet the needs of small businesses for capital investment.  After all, the problem 
Congress is said to have worried about, is long-term credit for small businesses. 
The legislation that created the Small Business Administration was enacted on 
July 30, 1953.
3  By 1954, the SBA was already making direct business loans and 
guaranteeing bank loans to small businesses, as well as making loans to victims of natural 
disasters, working to get government procurement contracts for small businesses and 
helping business owners with management and technical assistance and business training.  
Recognizing that private financial institutions are typically better than government 
agencies at deciding on which small business loans to underwrite, the SBA began moving 
away from making direct loans and toward guaranteeing private loans in the mid-1980s.  
Currently, the SBA makes direct loans only under very special circumstances.  
Guaranteed lending through the SBA’s 7(a) guaranteed loan program and the 504 loan 
program are the main form of SBA activity in lending markets. 
The 7(a) loan program is the more basic and more significant of these 
two programs.  Its name comes from Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act, 
which authorizes the agency to provide business loans to American small businesses.  All 
7(a) loans are provided by lenders who are called participants because they participate 
with SBA in the 7(a) program.  Not all lenders choose to participate, but most American 
banks do, as well as a number of nonbank lenders.  This expands the availability of 
lenders making loans under SBA guidelines. 
 
7(a) loans are available only on a guaranty basis.  This means that they are 
provided by lenders who choose to structure their own loans according to SBA's 
requirements and who apply for and receive a guaranty from SBA on a portion of this 
loan.  The SBA does not fully guaranty 7(a) loans.  The SBA guaranty is usually in the 
range of 50 to 85 percent of the loan amount, and the maximum guaranty is $1,000,000.  
The lender and SBA share the risk that a borrower will not be able to repay the loan in 
full. The guaranty is a guaranty against payment default and does not cover other 
contingencies such as imprudent decisions by the lender (such as underpricing of the 
                                                 
3 The act that created the SBA is Public Law 163. 
  7loan, failure to enforce loan covenants, or failure to perfect a lien on collateral) or 
misrepresentation by the borrower. 
The 504 loan program is a long-term financing tool for economic development 
within a community.  The 504 program provides growing businesses with long-term, 
fixed-rate financing for major fixed assets, such as land or buildings, through a certified 
development company (CDC).  A CDC is a nonprofit corporation set up to contribute to 
the economic development of its community.  CDCs work with the SBA and private-
sector lenders to provide financing to small businesses.  There are about 270 CDCs 
nationwide.  Each CDC covers a specific geographic area (SBA, 2004).  
Typically, a 504 project includes a loan from a private-sector lender covering up 
to 50 percent of the project cost, a loan from the CDC (backed by a 100 percent SBA-
guaranteed debenture) covering up to 40 percent of the cost, and a contribution of at least 
10 percent equity from the small business being helped.  The SBA-backed loan from the 
CDC is usually subordinate to the private loan, which has the effect of insulating the 
private lender from loss in the event of default.  Generally, a business must create or 
retain one job for every $50,000 provided by the SBA.  The maximum SBA debenture is 
$1,000,000 for meeting the job creation criteria or a community development goal and 
$1,300,000 for meeting a public policy goal.   Current public policy goals recognized by 
the SBA are as business district revitalization, expansion of exports, expansion of 
minority business development, rural development, enhanced economic competition, 
restructuring because of federally mandated standards or policies, changes necessitated 
by federal budget cutbacks, expansion of small business concerns owned and controlled 
by veterans, and expansion of small business concerns owned and controlled by women 
(SBA, 2004).   
4.  The questions, empirical strategy, and data  
Our empirical research focuses on SBA loan guarantees, which are only one of 
the several ways the government promotes small business lending. Federal Home Loan 
Banks, for example, are authorized by Congress to accept small enterprise loans as 
eligible collateral when they extend subsidized advances to banks, which reduces the cost 
  8of funding small business loan portfolios.
4  We chose to study the impact of SBA loan 
guarantees because if government intervention in the small business credit market is 
effective, the evidence is likely to be strongest in the SBA programs. This is because 
SBA loan guarantees are more likely to resolve the agency problems that give rise to 
credit rationing in these markets than do other approaches, like that of the Federal Home 
Loan Banks.  SBA programs also encompass all types of small business lenders, from 
community banks and thrifts to bigger banks.  Finally, the SBA has operated for a long 
time—more than a half a century. 
We take as our maintained hypothesis that credit market frictions—primarily in 
the form of costly information and verification of a small firm’s projects—can lead to 
socially suboptimal credit allocation.  To the extent that SBA loan guarantee programs 
mitigate credit market frictions, there should be a relationship between SBA-guaranteed 
lending and economic growth and development. Therefore, we test for whether SBA loan 
guarantees lessen credit market frictions by testing for whether measures of SBA lending 
are related to local economic growth.  Thus, our null hypothesis is that SBA lending has 
no discernible impact on local market economic growth. 
To examine this SBA growth hypothesis we utilize data from three sources.  The 
first source is loan-specific data—including borrower and lender information—on all 
SBA-guaranteed 7(a) and 504 loans from 2 January 1990 through 31 December 2002.  A 
breakdown of loan size, total credit and number of loans under each guarantee program is 
displayed in tables A1 through A3 of the appendix.  The second source is data on 
economics conditions from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) from 
1990 through 2001.  The third source is data from the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation’s annual summary of deposit data (SUMD) files.  All of our data are 
aggregated to the local market level.  We use Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) to 
define the relevant local market for urban areas and non-MSA counties as the local 
market for rural areas.  We focus on local markets because we suspect that it is at this 
level where the SBA-guaranteed lending should have the greatest impact.  Hence, our 
                                                 
4 See Craig and Thomson (2003) for a more complete discussion of the FHLBs’ role in supporting small 
firm finance. 
  9data set consists of approximately 2200 local market observations per year over 12 years 
(1990 through 2001).   
To test our null hypothesis we extend the analysis of Craig et al. (2005) who using 
weighted least squares to estimate a regression model relating measures of local 
economic performance to past economic performance, measures of SBA loan guarantees, 
with controls for national economic conditions and local banking market structure.  These 
authors estimate their data panel using stacked regression.  We extend Craig et al. by 
estimating a similar regression model, equation (1), using classic Arellano and Bond 
panel regression estimation and hence, unlike Craig et al. can exploit the richness of our 
the panel data.  We extend the analysis by estimating equation (2), the model with year 
dummy variables to control for fixed effects in the panel.  Our model is:  
t t t t t
t t t t t t
MDUM SBAM A SBA SBAG
HERF NBER EMPR SBADEP PICAP PICAP
ε α α α α
α α α α α α
+ + + + +
+ + + + + =
− − − −
− −
1 9 1 8 1 7 1 6
5 4 3 1 2 1 1 0
7           
 (1) 
Equation (1) uses per capita income (PICAP) at the local market level to proxy for 
economic conditions.  We are interested in how SBA loan guarantees affect changes in 
PICAP.  Hence we include the lagged value of PICAP as a regressor.  An alternative 
specification would be to use ∆PICAPt (= PICAPt – PICAPt-1) as the dependent variable 
– omitting PICAPt-1 from the right-hand side of (1).  However, this imposes the 
restriction that α1 equals zero which is rejected by the data. 
The primary variable of interest on the right side of the equation is SBADEPt-1 
(the total dollar amount of SBA-guaranteed loans scaled by total deposits in the market 
lagged one year).  We scale by total deposits instead of measures of total credit because 
we cannot construct measures of bank lending at the local market level.  Market-level 
deposit data are available, however, from the SUMD data, and total deposits should be 
highly correlated with lending.  We also include as controls for the impact of SBA 
lending: the share of SBA loans that are 7(a) loans (SBA7A), the share of SBA loans 
provided to manufacturing concerns (SBAM), and the SBA’s exposure on the outstanding 
balances of the SBA-guaranteed loans (SBAG).  For those observations where SBA 
  10guaranteed loans are zero SBA7A, SBAM, and SBAG are undefined and we set their 
values to zero and set MDUM equal to one.
5  
The deposit market Herfindahl index (HERF) is included in equation (1) to 
control for the structure of the local market.  Constructed at the market level using branch 
level deposit data from the SUMD database, HERF provides a measure of concentration, 
and presumably the competitiveness, of the local banking market.  The second variable is 
a dummy variable (MSA) that captures whether the market is urban (MSA = 1) or rural 
(MSA = 0).  Finally, we include the employment rate (EMPR) for the market and a 
dummy variable for NBER recessions (NBER = 1 if the national economy is in a 
recession, 0 otherwise) to control for local and national economic conditions.  The 
definitions of the variables used in the empirical analysis are in table 1.  Equation (2) 
t t t t t
t t t t t
t t t t
t t t t t
T T T T
T T T T T
T SBAMR AR SBA SBAGR
EMPR HERF SBADEP PCIAP PICAP
ε α α α α
α α α α α
α α α α
α α α α α
+ + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + +
+ + + + =
− − −
− −
2001 2000 1999 1998               
1997 1996 1995 1995 1994               
1993 7               
16 15 14 13
12 11 10 10 9
8 1 7 1 6 1 5
4 3 1 2 1 1 0
 (2) 
includes year dummies to control for time-series fixed effects.  To avoid the dummy 
variable trap we do not include a year dummy for 1992 and exclude the NBER dummy.  
As discussed below, because of the inclusion of lagged variables on the right-hand side of 
equations (1) and (2) and the need for an additional year of data to construct instruments 
for the right-hand side variables estimation is done over the 1992 to 2001 sample period. 
5.  The empirical results 
Panel estimation  
  Our econometric design was driven by several salient problems associated with 
our data.  First, endogeneity drips from the model, in ways that can not easily be assumed 
away.  For one thing, the dynamic nature of the model requires a lagged value of the per 
capita income variable that is endogenous by empirical design.  In addition, the policy 
variables, themselves, are probably not exogenous, at least contemporaneously, in that 
they may be decided upon based upon local characteristics that are also associated with 
                                                 
5 The alternative would be to throw out observations where SBA lending was absent, introducing sample 
selection bias into the results. 
  11per capita income.  Our solution was to use a set of instruments, largely lagged values of 
the right-hand variables.  The method of estimation is a two step method where the 
weighting matrix in the second stage is calculated according to Arellano and Bond 
(1991).  Because of this we denote our estimation technique a classic Arellano-Bond 
technique, although we do not use the levels as instruments for first differences as they 
did in their classic paper.   
  Many different lag structures for the instruments were examined, and generally 
the estimates that we report are robust to the specification of the lag length for the 
instrument set.  With too many lagged instruments, we cut down on the number of 
observations we could include from the beginning of the sample (because we did not 
have these lagged values.)  With two few lagged values, we did not have enough 
identification with which to determine whether a coefficient was significantly different 
from zero.  Having said this, however, there was a wide range of sets of lagged values of 
the instruments which yield essentially the same results that we report here.  The results 
of Table 3 use an instrument set that includes contemporaneous to the right hand side 
variable, (that is, if the right hand variable is a value that is lagged one period compared 
to the per capita income variable, then its first instrument is also lagged one period,) 
along with two additional lags.  Other sets that yield similar results include sets with 
more lags or a set that does not include the contemporaneous value but includes lags of 
two, three and four periods. 
 We corrected the standard errors for the estimates given the small sample 
problems typical estimators in a dynamic panel setting by using the corrections suggested 
in Kleibergen (2004) and implemented in Bond and Windmeijer (2003).  Note that this is 
especially important for those estimates that transform the variables by subtracting off 
their “within area” means.  These estimates are likely to be the most reliable estimates in 
that they are less likely to be biased by area-specific effects.  One example of such bias 
might be that an area that has a long history of being poor may get more small business 
funding than other areas.  The same things that cause it to have a low level of 
development also mean that it has a low growth rate.  Thus the area-specific effect will 
bias the estimate of the effect of small business loans downward. 
  12The sample consists of local economic markets for which we have complete data 
over the sample estimation period (1992 through 2001).  Equation (1) is estimated over 
the urban (MSAs) and rural (non-MSA counties) samples, as well as, the entire sample 
using the Arellano-Bond method and mean transformed data.  As the data reject pooling 
of urban and rural markets we only report the results for those two samples.  Descriptive 
statistics for the variables used in the regression can be found in table 2 and the 
estimation results are presented in table 3.   
The coefficient on the lagged SBA loan guarantee-to-deposit ratio is positive and 
significantly different from zero for both samples.  This result is in contrast to Craig et al. 
(2005) who find a positive and insignificant relationship between SBA loan guarantees 
and future economic performance.
6  The difference between our results and those of 
Craig et al. trace primarily to the strong assumptions implicit in their stacked regression 
model.  By taking greater advantage of the information in our time-series cross-section 
panel the Arellano-Bond panel regression methods are able to more precisely estimate the 
impact of SBA loan guarantees on economic growth.  
On the face of it, the small magnitude of the coefficient on SBADEPt-1 – one basis 
point in the rural sample and 27 basis points in the urban sample – suggests that the 
effects of SBA loan guarantees may not be economically significant.  However, 
judgments about the efficacy of SBA guaranteed lending on economic growth need to be 
viewed in the context of the magnitude of SBA activities.  SBA-guaranteed lending is a 
small part of the total banking market—on average, less than $7.45 of loan guarantees for 
every $1000 of deposits (0.75 percent of market deposits).  In other words, the small 
measurable economic impact of SBA loan guarantees on local economic growth would 
be expected given the limited role they play in the credit intermediation process.   
It is important to note that the statistical significance of our SBA lending variable 
in the rural sample appears to be less sensitive to our choice of instruments and lag 
structure than in the urban sample.  We suspect, however, that the sensitivity of 
SBADEPt-1 to the econometric specification of the Arellano and Bond panel regression 
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to yield a statistical relationship between it and per capita income.”  
  13model is due to the relatively small size of the urban sample (2820 time-series cross-
section observations). 
For the urban (MSA) sample, the coefficients on SBAGRt-1 and SBA7ARt-1 are 
significantly negative, while the coefficient on SBAMRt-1 is insignificantly positive.  
These results are largely in concert with an explanation that says lenders are relying more 
heavily on SBA loan guarantees to make loans in more depressed urban markets—ones 
with lower per capita income.  However, unlike Craig et al. we do not find a higher share 
of loans to small businesses engaged in manufacturing in the more economically vibrant 
urban markets.  The picture painted by our SBA lending structure variables is somewhat 
different for the rural (non-MSA) sample, where none of the coefficients on controls 
variables for the structure of SBA loan guarantees are significant.  This is in contrast to 
Craig et al. who fin that lenders in higher-income rural markets rely more heavily on 
SBA guarantees than lower-income ones.  We find no such differences.  For both samples 
the controls for economic activity—NBER dummy and EMPR—are significant and with 
the anticipated signs.  The coefficient on HERF (deposit market Herfindahl index) is 
positive but not significant for the rural sample. The coefficient on HERF is negative but 
not significant in the urban sample.   
Panel estimation with year dummies to control for fixed effects 
Equation (2) is estimated using Arellano & Bond Panel Regression method.  
However, in lieu of using mean transformed data fixed effects are controlled for by 
including dummy variables for each year in the estimation period, except for 1992 which 
is captured by the coefficient on the intercept.  As the year dummies would capture the 
effects of recession years and to avoid the dummy variable trap we exclude NBER as a 
regressor.  The panel regression results for the urban and rural samples appear in table 4. 
As with equation (1) the coefficient on the SBADEPt-1 is positive and significantly 
different from zero for both samples.  However, there is a slight but statistically 
significant change in the coefficient on this variable.  For the rural sample the coefficient 
on the lagged SBA-loan-guarantee-to-market-deposit ratio doubles to two basis points.  
For the urban sample the coefficient on SBADEPt-1 is three basis points lower, falling to 
just below 24 basis points.  Qualitatively, the results are not affected by this alternative 
  14specification of the regression model.  SBA loan guarantees as a share of overall credit 
intermediation has a significant, albeit economically small, impact on local economic 
growth.   
The primary difference in our results appears in the controls for market structure 
and for the structure of the SBA loan guarantees.  The coefficient on the deposit market 
Herfindahl index (HERF) in table 4 is significantly negative for both samples, and of 
relatively the same magnitude.  The difference in the behavior of HERF in tables 3 and 4 
likely traces to the slow evolution of market structure through time and hence, HERF was 
likely proxying for time-series fixed effects in equation (1).  The addition of time 
dummies in equation (2) mopped up the time-series fixed effects allowing HERF to more 
cleanly proxy for cross-sectional difference of market concentration on income growth 
through time.  The results in table 4 are in line with the industrial organization literature 
and may be explained in at least two ways.  First, per capita income is higher in more 
competitive markets, and HERF is a proxy for market competition.  Or, second, the 
negative correlation is the result of a set of market dynamics in which higher relative per 
capita income induces more commercial banks to enter the local market.  Furthermore, 
considering the substantial fixed cost associated with market entry, markets with 
relatively larger aggregate income levels might also experience more entry.  
The structure of SBA loan guarantees on economic performance in table 4 differs 
markedly from the results in table 3.  First, for urban markets the coefficients SBAGRt-1 
and SBA7ARt-1 are negative but no longer significantly different from zero.  For rural 
markets the coefficients on these variables are now significantly negative.  For both 
samples the coefficient on SBAMRt-1 is positive and insignificant as before.  Our table 4 
results suggest that lenders in depressed rural markets rely more heavily on SBA loan 
guarantees and the structure of guarantees was not dependent on market conditions in 
urban markets.  This is opposite what we found earlier.  Hence, one should be careful 
about drawing inferences about the determinants of lender demand for SBA loan 
guarantees in urban and local markets based table 3 and table 4 results alone. 
Overall, our regression results are consistent with the hypothesis that SBA loan 
guarantees have positive, albeit small net, social benefits.  In contrast to Craig et al. 
  15(2005) we find consistent evidence that the level of SBA-guaranteed lending activity (per 
$1000 of deposits) is related to the growth of per capita income at the local market level – 
for both urban and rural markets.  This impact of SBA-guaranteed lending on growth 
appears to be small, as the largest coefficient on the SBADEPt-1 regressor is 27 basis 
points.   
6.  Conclusions and extensions to the analysis 
SBA loan guarantee programs are one of many government interventions into 
markets aimed at promoting small business.  The rationale for these guarantees appears to 
be that credit market imperfections can result in small enterprises being credit rationed—
particularly for longer-term loans for purposes such capital expansion.  If SBA loan 
guarantees indeed reduce credit rationing in the markets for small business loans, then 
there should be a relationship between measures of SBA activities and economic growth.  
This is what we find.  There is a positive (although small) and significant relationship 
between the level of SBA lending in a market and future personal income growth.   
  These results should be interpreted with caution.  First, we are unable to control 
for small business lending at the market level and hence, we do not know whether SBA 
loan guarantees are contributing to growth by helping to complete the market or are 
simply proxying for small business lending in the market.  Second, we are not able to test 
whether SBA loan guarantees materially increase the volume of small business lending in 
a market – a question that is related to who captures the subsidy associated with SBA 
loan guarantees.  Future research will seek to shed light on these questions by examining 
SBA guaranteed lending at the depository institution level. 
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  18Table 1:  Variable Definitions 
 
Variable    Definition Source 
SBADEP  SBA Guaranteed Loans per $000 of deposits  SBA, FDIC SUMD 
HERF  Deposit market herfindahl   FDIC SUMD 
EMPR  Employment rate  BLS 
SBAGR  Portion of total SBA guaranteed loan balances covered by SBA guarantee  SBA 
SBA7AR  Portion of total SBA guaranteed loan balances that are 7(a) loans  SBA 
SBAMR  Portion of total SBA guaranteed loan balances that are loans to manufacturing concerns  SBA 
PICAP  Per capita income  BEA 
MDUM  Dummy variable =1 if SBA guaranteed loans is zero, 0 otherwise  June Call Report 
LNPI  Natural log of personal income  BEA 
TXXXX Time-series fixed-effects dummies for 1993-2001 = 1 if year = XXXX, 0 otherwise   
LNSBA  Natural log of total SBA guranteed loans  SBA 
LNDEP  Natural log of total deposits  FDIC SUMD 
LNEMPR  Natural log of the employment rate  BEA 
Notes:  SBA -- Small Business administration, FDIC SUMD -- Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Summary of Deposit Data, BEA -- Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, BLS -- Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics for Equation (1) Variables 
 
 Variable  N  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
 PICAP  24872 18.9273  4.5517  6.09  58.70 
 SBADEPt-1
a 24872 7.4450  100.8813  0  8754.2 
 HERF
b 24872 0.5309  0.2884  0.03  1 
 EMPR (%)  24872 93.9186  3.2051  61.47  99.30 
 NBER  24872 0.1810  0.3850  0  1 
 MSADUM  24872 0.1389  0.3458  0  1 
 SBAGRt-1 24872 0.6205  0.3536  0  1 
 SBA7ARt-1 24872 0.6737  0.4263  0  1 
 SBAMRt-1 24872 0.1149  0.2356  0  1 
 PICAPt-1 24872 18.2244  4.3781  5.50  58.70 
 MDUM
c 24872 0.2378  0.4257  0  1 
Source:  Small Business Administration, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, and authors' Calculations 
Notes:  a.   Guaranteed small business loans per $000 of deposits. 
b.  The Herfindahl index has been normalized to a variable between 0 and 1. 
c.  For markets where there was no recorded SBA guaranteed loan information we set 
the value of the SBA lending proxies to 0 and set MDUM = 1 (0 otherwise). 
 
  21Table 3: Arellano & Bond Panel Regression Estimation of Equation (1) using mean 
differenced data 
t t t
t t t t t t t t
MDUM SBAM
A SBA SBAG HERF NBER EMPR SBADEP PICAP PICAP
ε α α
α α α α α α
+ + +
+ + + + + + =
− −
− − − −
1 9 1 8
1 7 1 6 5 4 3 1 2 1






Coefficient  Std.Error    t-value Coefficient Std.Error t-value
 PICAPt-1 1.02700 0.00805  128.00** 0.99671  0.01143  87.20**
 SBADEPt-1 0.00010 0.00002  4.72** 0.00274  0.00098  2.80** 
 HERF  0.08172 0.06442 1.27 -0.12899  0.08348  -1.55 
 EMPR   0.05366 0.00541  9.91** 0.16689  0.02337  7.14** 
 NBER  -0.26369 0.03240  -8.14**  -0.37562  0.05659  -6.64** 
 SBAGRt-1 0.03393 0.15100 0.23 -1.27771  0.27830  -4.59** 
 SBA7ARt-1 -0.02380 0.04762 -0.50 -0.30439  0.08857  -3.44** 
 SBAMRt-1 0.01619 0.03431 0.47  0.04666  0.07656  0.61 
 MDUM  -0.06414 0.15780 -0.41 -1.16220  0.28200  -4.12** 
                
sigma     1.02741        0.51250    
sigma2     1.05557        0.26265    
Residual sum of 
squares     16148.06        655.32    
Total sum of squares     75807.26        22536.25    
Number of 
observations      17317        2820    
Number of parameters       2019        325    
Wald (joint):  χ2(9) =       131600**        102000**    
Sargan test:  χ2(13) =          16.86        42.91**    
AR(1) test:  N(0,1) =             -11.53        -4.03**    
AR(2) test:  N(0,1) =             3.809**        -1.44    
           
** -- significant at 1 percent; * -- significant at 5 percent       
2-step estimation using DPD           
Using finite sample corrected standard errors         
Transformation used: within groups (deviation from individual means)     
  22Table 4:  Arellano & Bond Panel Regression Estimation of Equation (2) 
t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t
T T T T T T T T T
T SBAMR AR SBA SBAGR EMPR HERF SBADEP PCIAP PICAP
ε α α α α α α α α α
α α α α α α α α α
+ + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + = − − − − −
2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1995 1994          
1993 7  
16 15 14 13 12 11 10 10 9
8 1 7 1 6 1 5 4 3 1 2 1 1 0  
 
Non MSA  MSA  Dependent Variable:  
PICAP    
Coefficient   Std.Error    t-value Coefficient Std.Error  t-value 
 PICAPt-1 0.98531 0.00615  160.00** 1.04660  0.00387  270.00**
 SBADEPt-1 0.00021 0.00003  7.91** 0.00237  0.00082  2.90** 
 HERF  -0.08306 0.02105 -3.95* -0.08966  0.04191  -2.14* 
 EMPR   0.02682 0.00271  9.88** 0.03074  0.00479  6.42* 
 SBAGRt-1 -0.25500 0.11550 -2.21* -0.01956  0.20790  -0.094 
 SBA7ARt-1 -0.11590 0.03671 -3.16* -0.00536  0.06875  -0.078 
 SBAMRt-1 0.02219 0.02902 0.77  0.06178  0.06018 1.03 
 MDUM  -0.39869 0.12130  -3.29**  -0.01833  0.22060  -0.0831 
 Intercept  -1.00442 0.20350  -4.93**  -2.79637  0.47540  -5.88** 
T1993  -0.40890 0.03103  -13.20**  -0.37070  0.03156  -11.70** 
T1994  -0.24364 0.02672  -9.12**  -0.22369  0.02805  -7.97** 
T1995  -0.56850 0.02748  -20.70**  -0.22529  0.03008  -7.49** 
T1996  0.14953 0.02871  5.21**  -0.23357  0.03286  -7.11** 
T1997  -0.13864 0.03027  -4.58**  -0.12430  0.03814  -3.26** 
T1998  -0.01558 0.03337 -0.46  0.08663 0.03689 2.35* 
T1999  -0.32124 0.03641  -8.82**  -0.47518  0.03915  -12.10** 
T2000  0.08656 0.03581 2.42* 0.24188  0.04254  5.69** 
T2001  -0.28454 0.04162  -6.84**  -0.75348  0.07019  -10.70** 
 MSADUM                   
                  
sigma     0.94090        0.46852    
sigma2     0.88529        0.21952    
Residual sum of 
squares     17133.03        684.67    
Total sum of squares     306858.77       84703.89    
Number of 
observations      19371        3137    
Number of parameters       18        18    
Wald (joint):   χ2(8) =        111400**        90720**    
Wald (dummy): χ2(10) 
=          949.3**        817.9**    
Wald (time):  χ2(9) =     948.4**        811.1**    
AR(1) test:  N(0,1) =             -10.74**        0.15    
AR(2) test:  N(0,1) =             6.001**        -0.62    
                    
** -- significant at 1 percent; * -- significant at 5 percent 
Using finite sample corrected standard errors 
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Table A1:  Average SBA Loan $ 
   Urban Rural  Total 
Year  504 7A  Total  504 7A  Total  Sample 
1991  262,159 207,984 213,260 300,958 205,233 213,592 213,345
1992  302,788 244,221 249,582 316,912 232,181 238,305 246,923
1993  325,592 250,624 258,006 346,530 244,144 252,845 256,859
1994  341,261 205,738 218,756 334,919 184,367 195,604 213,855
1995  350,786 150,363 169,179 364,684 125,882 145,227 164,796
1996  376,730 190,938 213,915 341,966 145,963 168,762 206,933
1997  369,753 224,912 238,320 310,629 174,399 188,908 231,171
1998  385,883 236,159 253,764 308,272 199,479 212,395 247,994
1999  412,650 253,674 270,483 335,416 195,475 211,379 263,591
2000  427,095 260,575 277,788 343,140 197,743 213,899 269,633
2001  440,611 241,833 264,551 361,987 195,511 216,531 257,741
Sample  377,773 221,391 237,727 335,527 184,414 199,225 231,391
Source:  United States Small Business Administration and authors’ calculations 
 
 
Table A2:  Total SBA Loans ($000) 
   Urban Rural  Total 
Year 504  7A  Total  504  7A  Total  Sample 
1991  168,044 1,235,636 1,403,680 58,687 418,265 476,952 1,880,632
1992  380,301 3,043,969 3,424,270 96,975 912,007 1,008,982 4,433,252
1993  564,577 3,978,656 4,543,233 148,315 1,125,014 1,273,329 5,816,562
1994  1,015,593 5,761,698 6,777,291 207,985 1,419,439 1,627,423 8,404,715
1995  1,165,310 4,821,247 5,986,557 234,127 916,799 1,150,926 7,137,483
1996  1,727,682 6,204,515 7,932,197 269,811 874,902 1,144,713 9,076,910
1997  1,219,816 7,273,196 8,493,012 199,424 939,313 1,138,736 9,631,748
1998  1,464,425 6,725,796 8,190,221 191,437 919,600 1,111,037 9,301,258
1999  1,521,028 7,908,288 9,429,316 175,423 797,344 972,767 10,402,083
2000  1,319,722 6,984,461 8,304,183 166,766 768,827 935,593 9,239,776
2001  1,238,118 5,266,396 6,504,514 185,699 694,065 879,765 7,384,279
Sample  11,784,617 59,203,858 70,988,475 1,934,647 9,785,575 11,720,223 82,708,698
Source:  United States Small Business Administration and authors’ calculations 
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Table A3: Total Number of SBA Loans 
   Urban Rural  Total 
Year 504  7A  Total  504  7A  Total  Sample 
1991  641 5941 6,582 195 2038 2,233  8,815
1992  1256 12464 13,720 306 3928 4,234  17,954
1993  1734 15875 17,609 428 4608 5,036  22,645
1994  2976 28005 30,981 621 7699 8,320  39,301
1995  3322 32064 35,386 642 7283 7,925  43,311
1996  4586 32495 37,081 789 5994 6,783  43,864
1997  3299 32338 35,637 642 5386 6,028  41,665
1998  3795 28480 32,275 621 4610 5,231  37,506
1999  3686 31175 34,861 523 4079 4,602  39,463
2000  3090 26804 29,894 486 3888 4,374  34,268
2001  2810 21777 24,587 513 3550 4,063  28,650
Sample  31,195 267,418 298,613 5,766 53,063 58,829 357,442
Source:  United States Small Business Administration and authors’ calculations 
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